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The EPA, Outer Continental Shelf Sources, and Deference
Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands
REDOIL v. U.S. E.P.A'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") receives
much criticism.2 There are people and groups who think the
agency puts too many unnecessary restrictions on businesses, an
argument that is more charged than usual during the current
strained economic situation in the United States.3 Conversely,
there are those who believe the EPA does not go far enough.4
Rather than make much-needed improvements to the
environment, some would say, the EPA is more concerned with
politics and how its decisions will affect businesses.
5
However, at times it must be wondered if the EPA gets
more than its fair share of negativity. Resisting Environmental
Destruction on Indigenous Lands, REDOIL v. U.S. E.P.A.
(hereinafter REDOIL v. E.P.A.) has great potential to be another
controversial decision.6 In the instant case, the EPA granted two
permits to Shell Gulf of Mexico and Shell Offshore (hereby
collectively referred to as "Shell"), which would allow them to
drill in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas off the coast of Alaska.
7
' 704 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2012).
2 See, e.g., JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41561, EPA REGULATIONS:
Too MUCH, Too LITTLE, OR ON TRACK? 1-3 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41561.pdf.
3 Id. at 1-2.4 Id. at 2-3.
5Id.
6 See, e.g., Puma Nemani, EPA Defends Rulesfor Drilling Vessel Emissions,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/08/30/49811 .htm.
7 Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S. E.P.A.,
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Environmentally conscious groups appealed to the Environmental
Appeals Board ("EAB"), where the complaints were dismissed.8
Before the case went before the Ninth Circuit, environmental
groups were rallying, arguing the EPA went too easy on Shell. 9
Under the permits, environmentalists feared, ninety percent of its
polluting emissions would go unregulated.' 0 On the other side of
the issue were those with an economic interest in the EPA's
decision, such as the state of Alaska." Alaska submitted an
amicus brief in support of Shell's permits, specifically citing its
economic interest in allowing Shell to drill for oil in the Chukchi
and Beaufort Seas. 12  The court held that the EPA was due
Chevron and Auer deference in its decision-making, and as such
its permits were upheld.'
3
Now, judicial deference to federal agency decisions
receives much criticism.' 4  The Chevron deference test leaves
room, especially in step two, for judges to insert their own bias.
Auer deference too has many detractors, including a Supreme
Court Justice. 15 Not only does Auer deference allow the EPA to
704 F.3d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 2012).
8 Id. at 747.
9 Nemani, supra note 6.
1° Id.
11 See Amicus Brief for State of Alaska, Resisting Envtl. Destruction on
Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S. E.P.A., 704 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2012) No.
12-70518, 2012 WL 1943747.
12 Id. at *1-2.
13 Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S. E.P.A.,
704 F.3d 743, 46 (9th Cir. 2012).
14 See James Christman, David S. Harlow & Craig Harrison, Courts Should
Not Defer to Agencies'Interpretations of Their Own Rules, 15 LEGAL




15 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254,2265
(2011).
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 20, No. 2
intrude upon Congress's lawmaking power, but, like the Chevron
deference test, it allows judges reviewing agency decisions to
shape the outcome of a trial based upon their own political
beliefs. So perhaps the EPA should not get blamed when a pro-
business or pro-environment decision is made. Instead, maybe
the deferential standards under which its actions are reviewed
should be reexamined for flaws that let in political agendas.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Authority to regulate Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS")
sources was delegated to the EPA by Congress in 1990.16
REDOIL v. E.P.A. involved a conflict over permits issued to
Shell in its oil and gas exploration off the coast of Alaska, in the
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. 17 Shell sought to acquire permits
required by the EPA to emit pollutants in its drilling activities as
required by the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.' 8 As part
of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program ("PSD
program"), those who wish to build new sources of pollution
must obtain a permit through a New Source Review process. 19 In
order to be granted a permit, Shell must meet two statutory
requirements: (1) it must conduct air quality analyses which must
show that its operations will not significantly contribute to air
pollution, and (2) Shell must use the best available control
16 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2006). The statute states in part, "Not later than 12
months after November 15, 1990, following consultation with the Secretary of
the Interior and the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, the
Administrator, by rule, shall establish requirements to control air pollution
from Outer Continental Shelf sources located offshore of the States along the
Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic Coasts (other than Outer Continental Shelf sources
located offshore of the North Slope Borough of the State of Alaska), and along
the United States Gulf Coast off the State of Florida..." Id.
'
7 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 746.
18 Id. at 746-748; 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (stating, "each applicable implementation
plan shall contain emission limitations and such other measures as may be
necessary, as determined under regulations promulgated under this part, to
P revent significant deterioration of air quality.").REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 748.
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technology ("BACT").20 The EPA granted the permits and
upheld their issuance in two administrative appeals to the EAB,
which is the first appeals body to review EPA decisions.
2 1
The plaintiffs were environmentally conscious groups,
including Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous
Lands (plaintiffs hereby referred collectively as "REDOIL"). 22
Two permits were the source of contention in this case, one for
each of the two seas Shell wishes to explore: the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas.23 The permits allow Shell to use its drillship each
year between July 1 and November 30.24 Through the notice and
public comment periods of each permit, the EPA determined
Shell must use BACT to limit pollution in accordance with the
Clean Air Act. 25 In the case of the Discoverer, Shell's drillship,
BACT is only required to be used when that ship is anchored to
the seabed, or when another vessel is attached to the drillship.
26
Aside from those instances, BACT does not have to be used for
the Discoverer's supporting vessels.
27
REDOIL first appealed to the EAB, arguing BACT must
be employed by Shell's entire fleet whenever those vessels are
operating within twenty-five feet of the drillship, even if the
support vessels are not physically tied to it.28 The EAB denied
review on that issue, but remanded back to the EPA for reasons
not important to the case at hand.29 Thereafter, the EPA granted
20 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3)-(4)).
21 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 747.
12 Id. at 746.
23 Id. at 746-47.
24 Id. at 746.
25 Id. at 747.
26 id.
27 Id. The Discoverer's supporting vessels consisted of ice breakers, oil spill
response vessels, and a supply ship. Id.28 Id.
29 Id. The court did not go into specifics in its opinion, but the EAB wanted the
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a five hundred meter radius exemption that exempted Shell from
ambient air standards 30 as long as a safety zone that restricted
public access to the exploratory areas was imposed. 3' REDOIL
again appealed to the EAB, alleging the exemption did not
comport with the EPA's definition of "ambient air standards,"
which the EAB dismissed.32 REDOIL then sought review in the
Ninth Circuit regarding the dismissal of its two prior appeals to
the EAB.
Before it reached its holding, the Ninth Circuit set out the
standard of review for the EAB's decisions. 34 The permits were
entitled to Chevron deference, because the EPA was interpreting
its own statute,35 and the ambient air exemption was entitled to
Auer deference, because the EPA was interpreting its own
regulation.36 Using Chevron deference, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Clean Air Act was ambiguous as to when BACT must be
applied regarding OCS sources because Congress's intent was
not specific.37  The EPA's interpretation of what the permits
required under the Clean Air Act is controlling unless plainly
inconsistent with the regulation.38  Therefore, the EPA's
interpretation was upheld because the interpretation of the OCS
statute was reasonable and consistent with the Clean Air Act's
EPA to clean up some administrative matters. Id. (citing In re Shell Gulf of
Mexico, Inc., OCS Appeal Nos. 10-01 through 10-04, 15 E.A.D. - , (Dec.
30, 2010)).
30 Ambient air standards, formerly referred to as National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, or "NAAQS"), are pollution levels that the air must remain below
for health and safety concerns. 40 CFR § 50.1-50.18 (1990).
"' REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 747.32 id.
33 id.
34 1d. at 749.
35 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-
66 (1984).
36 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).37 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 750.38 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
155
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regulations. 39 The EPA's interpretation of the OCS statute does
not require BACT to be used if the OCS source's support vessels
are not physically attached to the OCS source. 40 The court also
held the ambient air exemption was permissible because it was
conditioned on restricting public access, which conformed to the
EPA's prior treatment of ambient air standards in its
regulations.4'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Air Act
In 1970, Congress passed the Clean Air Act with the
intention to prevent air pollution to "promote public health and
welfare. 4 2 Amendments to the Act were first issued in 1977,
which were significant in that the PSD program was
promulgated4 3  This new component of the Clean Air Act
requires preconstruction permits to be issued for sources of air
pollution, with the condition that BACT will be used to prevent
or reduce emissions.44 The BACT to be used in a given situation
is determined by the EPA, which requires implementation of the
technology that results in a significant reduction in emissions of
air pollutants.45 These requirements therefore furthered the Clean
Air Act's goal of protecting human health.46
In 1990, more amendments to the Clean Air Act were
passed, which had the effect of extending the EPA's jurisdiction
39 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 752.
4 id.
41 Id. at 753.
42 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).4 3 Id. § 7475.
44Id.
45 I d. § 7479(3).
46 See id. §. 06)3).
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 20, No. 2
to OCS sources.47 There was growing concern during the first
Bush administration that oil drilling offshore was becoming a
48problem. Resources were being depleted and the air was
suffering just as much as it did over factories on land, and thus,
some thought, those ships should be regulated as if they were on
land.49  These potential sources of air pollution could be
regulated by the EPA if located offshore in the Pacific, Arctic,
and Atlantic Oceans, and some areas off the Gulf of Mexico.
50
An "OCS source" is defined as "any equipment, activity, or
facility" that "(i) emits or has the potential to emit any air
pollutant, (ii) is regulated or authorized under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, and (iii) is located on the Outer
Continental Shelf or in or on waters above the Outer Continental
Shelf.",51 This definition further states that emissions from the
OCS sources and any of its associated vessels shall be considered
direct emissions of the OCS source, when those secondary
vessels are within twenty-five miles of the OCS source.52 The
agency's jurisdiction, however, is limited to "the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and ... all installations and
other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the
seabed., 53  The 1992 regulations concerning the OCS portion of
the Clean Air Act added to the definition of "OCS source" to
include vessels when they are attached to the seabed or physically
attached to the OCS source itself.54  The Clean Air Act's
provisions regarding OCS sources not only had environmental
underpinnings, but also represented federal interests. 55 Federal
4 71 d. § 7627(a)(1).
48 Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer
Continental Shelf Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for Change, 12 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENYTL. L. 75, 77-78 (1992).
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(1).
so Id.
51 Id. § 7627(a)(4)(C).
52 Id. § 7627(a)(4)(C)(iii).
" 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2006).
14 40 C .F.R. § 55.2 (2014).
55 David W. Robertson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act's Provisions
on Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Choice of Law: Correcting the Fifth Circuit's
THE EPA, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SOURCES, AND
DEFERENCE RESISTING ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION ON
INDIGENOUS LANDS
jurisdiction was exerted over "all submerged lands lying seaward
and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters" 56 in
order to make sure it had control over the resources the shelf
contained.57
Section 7627, which extended the EPA's jurisdiction to
OCS sources, was enacted after Natural Resources Defense
58Council, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. In that case, the EPA was
challenged for its decision to subject the Clean Air Act's
requirements onto vessels unloading at marine terminals and not
attributing any of the emissions to those terminals.5 9 The EPA
had earlier decided it had no authority over the terminals and
revoked the vessel emissions requirements. 60 The court held that
the EPA had come to the improper understanding of Congress's
intent and should still attribute emissions to those marine
terminals, even if it would be difficult to do so.6' Thus, the issue
was remanded to the EPA to come up with a way to determine
liability for terminal owners. 62 However, the D.C. Circuit agreed
with the EPA that emissions from ships moving to and from the
terminal were "secondary emissions" that should be attributed to
the terminals, even if the EPA lacked the proper guidelines to do
SO.6 3 This case was decided before Chevron, and in the opinion
Mistakes, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 487, 493 (2007).
5643 U.S.C. § 133 1(a).
57 Robertson, supra note 55, at 497.
58 The case was decided in 1984. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 725 F.2d 761, at 761 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The statute was enacted
in 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(1).
59 Natural Res. Def Council Inc., 725 F.2d at 763.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 763-64.
62 id.
63 Id. at 764.
64 Natural Res. Def Council Inc. was decided January 17, 1984. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 725 F.2d at 725. Chevron was decided June 25, 1984.
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the court struggled to determine how much deference should be
65given to the EPA. There were two ways of thinking the court
could follow: (1) courts should defer to an agency's interpretation
as long as it is "reasonable," or (2) courts have the final say
regarding statutory meaning. 66 The court of appeals ultimately
dodged the issue of how much deference the EPA was due,
instead ruling that it did not matter in this case because the EPA
did not at all follow its administrative obligation in regulating
marine terminals. 67 Soon after, the Supreme Court would set out
the proper deference standard in Chevron.
68
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Chevron Deference
Federal agencies were given their decision-making
authority from Congressional statutes. 69  Under the
Administrative Procedure Act 70 and the Supreme Court's test in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,71
when an agency interprets a statute that it is responsible for
administrating, courts will, under certain circumstances, defer to
that interpretation. The issue in Chevron involved the Clean Air
Act's 1977 amendments' definition of "source." 72  The EPA
argued its interpretation of its own statute should be given
deference. 73  The Supreme Court laid out the process courts
should undertake when reviewing a federal agency's decision,
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, at 837 (1984).
65 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 725 F.2d at 767-68.
66 Id. at 767.
67 Id. at 767-68.
68 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
69 40 C.F.R. § 1505.1.
70 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2011).
71 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43.
72 Id. at 842.
71 Id. at 844-45.
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which gives the agency substantial deference. 74 The first step in
the two-part test is to determine if Congress has clearly spoken
on the issue. 75 If so, that intent controls the interpretation of the
statute, and both the agency and the court must honor that
intent.76 If the agency has not given effect to Congress's clear
intent, the Court will not defer to the agency's interpretation. 77 In
the second step, if Congress has not specifically addressed the
question before the court, the court should defer to the agency's
interpretation if it is reasonable. 7
The Chevron deference test has been implemented in
many environmental law cases. For example, it was referenced
in a case cited in Resisting Environmental Destruction on
Indigenous Lands, REDOIL v. U.S. E.P.A., from the District of
Columbia Appellate Court, Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control Dist. v. U.S. E.P.A.7 9 At issue in that case was the EPA's
refusal to regulate maritime vessels in transit. 80  The court
resolved the case using the first step in the Chevron test, finding
that Congress had clearly spoken on the issue and as such its
intention must be followed. 81  The Clean Air Act, the court
determined, expressed Congress's intent that vessels in transit
should be regulated.82 An example of an environmental case that
featured the court using step two in Chevron is Rapanos v. U.S.
83
In that case, the court had to decide if the EPA's definition of
"navigable waters" as used in the Clean Water Act was
74 Id. at 843-44.
75 d. at 842.
76 id.
77 Id. at 843.
18 Id. at 843-44.
7931 F.3d 1179, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1181.
82 id.
83 547 U.S. 715, 757 (2006).
160
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reasonable under the statute.84 Congress's intent was found to be
vague because it had not provided a definition of "navigable
waters" in the Clean Water Act. 85 Moving to Chevron step two,
the court analyzed the issue by looking at the statutory language
and held that the agency's interpretation was impermissible.
86
Though it is true the EPA is allowed deference in its




In addition to Chevron deference towards agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, courts also give deference
to agencies in interpreting their own ambiguous regulations,
commonly referred to as Auer deference. 88 The rationale behind
such deference is articulated in the Auer case, where it is written
that "[a] rule requiring [an agency] to construe [its] own
regulations narrowly would make little sense, since [it] is free to
write the regulations as broadly as [it] wishes, subject only to the
limits imposed by the statute." 89 Auer deference has lately come
under attack for Piving agencies leeway in promulgating their
own regulations. 9  This argument was recently articulated by
Supreme Court Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Talk
America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.91 Justice Scalia
wrote, "[i]t seems contrary to fundamental principles of
separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law
84 ld. at 740.
85 Id. at 731.
86 1d. at 731-32.
87 1d. at 732.
88 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
89 1d. at 463.
90 Jon Robinson, Justice Scalia Questions Validity of Deference to Agency
Interpretations, NAVWATERS.COM (June 10, 2011),
http://navwaters.com/2011/06/1 0/justice-scalia-questions-validity-of-
deference-to-agency-interpretations/.
91 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 131 S. Ct 2254, 2265
(2011).
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to interpret it as well., 92 Rather, he argued, the processes of
lawmaking and promulgating those laws should be kept
separate. 93 The EPA enjoys special deference now, but problems
have been identified with giving them so much authority that the
tide could soon turn against it.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The BACTIssue
REDOIL petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review the EAB's
dismissal of its argument alleging BACT should apply to Shell's
entire fleet. 94  Before ruling on that issue, the Ninth Circuit
studied the Clean Air Act's 1977 amendments, which called for
the PSD program that would ensure all new construction projects
for major sources of air pollution could not be constructed
without a permit. 95 REDOIL's argument centered on the second
requirement of a PSD program-that BACT must be applied.
96
The court had to determine whether the statute required
the PSD program to be applied to support vessels operating
within twenty-five miles of an OCS source.97 The EPA argued
the statute was ambiguous, and therefore its interpretation must
92 Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93 id.
94 Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S. E.P.A.,
704 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2012).
9' Id. at 748. Recall that PSD permits involve two conditions: (1) the applicant
must conduct air quality analysis showing its emissions will not violate air
quality standards, and (2) BACT must be applied. Id.96 id.
97 Id. at 749.
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be given deference.98  The court first began by determining
whether the Chevron deference test should be applied.99
Both parties agreed the Discoverer must comply with the
BACT requirement when it is anchored to the seabed and when
its support vessels are attached.'00  However, the parties
disagreed about whether the BACT requirement applied when
support vessels are not attached to the drillship.'10  The EPA
determined support vessels are not considered an OCS source
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and thus not
required to use BACT. 10 2 Though the analysis would seem to
end there, REDOIL pointed out a contradictory regulation, which
stated pollutant emissions from support vessels are to be
considered emissions from the OCS vessel if they are within
twenty-five miles of the OCS source.I3
Because Congress inserted two conflicting provisions,
one maintaining support vessels are not OCS sources and the
other stating emissions from those vessels can be aggregated to
the OCS's emissions, the court looked at the entire Clean Air Act
to try to parse out what should be done. 10 4 The Ninth Circuit
looked to how the Act was structured, and specifically how Title
I required stationary sources to participate in the PSD program.1
0 5
Congress specifically stated that the EPA should "control air
pollution from Outer Continental Shelf sources" by ensuring
sources of pollution comply with the PSD program
requirements. 10 6 Section 7627, the conflicting provision, stated,
"[f]or purposes of this subsection, emissions from any vessel








106 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(1) (2006).
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while at the OCS source or en route to or from the OCS source
within 25 miles of the OCS source, shall be considered direct
emissions from the OCS source."'107 REDOIL contended that
based upon this provision, BACT must be applied to all support
vessels within twenty-five miles of the OCS source. 0 8 However,
the court found that was not necessarily true, because this clause
does not explicitly define "OCS source.' 10 9 The court studied the
language of § 7627 closely, and found that "the direct emissions
clause maintains a distinction between an OCS source, to which
all PSD requirements apply, and vessels servicing an OCS
source, to which unspecified requirements apply because their
emissions must be considered direct emissions from the OCS
source."110 The statute did not require potential sources of air
pollution within twenty-five miles of the OCS source to also be
considered OCS sources." '
Besides reviewing the language of the OCS statute, the
court also looked at the structure of the Clean Air Act as a
whole. 1 2 Title I contained the PSD program requirements for
stationary sources of air pollution, while Title II covered mobile
sources. 113 Regulations define "marine engine" as "a nonroad
engine that is installed or intended to be installed on a marine
vessel."'"14 The court compared this definition to the one for
"stationary source," which did not include "emissions resulting
directly from an internal combustion engine for transportation
purposes or from a nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle."
'
"15
107 Id. § 7627(a)(4)(C)(iii).
'
08 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 750.
109 Id.
0 Id. at 751.
111 Id112id.
113 id
114 40 C.F.R. § 89.2.
115 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 751 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(z) (2006)).
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Reading all of these PSD provisions together, the court held
BACT should only apply to stationary OCS sources. 1 6 The court
concluded that if Congress intended otherwise its intention was
ambiguous.117
REDOIL, in an effort to avoid ambiguity, maintained that
the legislative history of § 7627 demonstrated that Congress
intended to treat support vessels as OCS sources because the
section was enacted after Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. "18 was decided. 19 However, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed this contention and pointed out that legislative history
is only needed when there is ambiguity and cannot be used to
show a lack of ambiguity. 12  Nonetheless, the fact that § 7627
was passed by Congress after Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A, was not determinative of Congress'
intended treatment of pollution from support vessels even though
the court in that case chose to uphold the EPA's decision to treat
emissions from support vessels as "secondary emissions.' 21 The
statute remained ambiguous. 22
When a statute is ambiguous, a court can only reject an
agency's interpretation if it is unreasonable.' 23 Here, the EAB,
who first handled the appeal, dealt with the Act's ambiguity by
first determining the total emissions from the entire fleet,
including the drillship and the support vessels.' 24 That number
was then used to see if PSD requirements should be imposed on
Shell.125 The Ninth Circuit found this method reasonable because
it complemented the OCS regulations, which accounted for
"
6 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 751.
117Id.
118 725 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
"
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excluding secondary vessel emissions by including that figure in
its initial PSD determination. 126 Next, the EAB resolved the
statutory ambiguity by concluding the EPA took into account the
total emissions when issuing the permits.' 27  The EPA
determined that when the supply vessels are not attached to the
Discoverer, the BACT does not need to apply to them, because
under those circumstances those vessels are not considered OCS
sources under the statute. 128 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found the
EPA's interpretation of the ambiguous statute reasonable, and
agreed with the EAB. 129  Therefore, BACT did not apply to
support vessels not attached to the OCS source.
1 30
B. The Ambient Air Exemption Issue
Even though the permits were allowed to stand, REDOIL
hoped to restrain Shell's operations in its second argument. It
challenged the EPA's decision to grant Shell an ambient air
exemption with a conditional safety zone requirement.13' Both
parties and the court agreed that a letter from a former EPA
administrator, Douglas Costle, provided the longstanding
interpretation of what qualified as an ambient air exemption.'
32
An ambient air exemption is only allowed in cases where the
atmosphere is over an area controlled by the OCS source and is
restricted to the public; that is, the area is accessible only to those
working for the company that has the permit and is otherwise
restricted to other non-employees.' 33 Using the established rule






131 Id. at 747.
132 Id. at 753.
133 Id.
166
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known as Auer deference, the court stated it cannot overturn the
EAB's determination unless the EPA's interpretation was clearly
erroneous. 1
34
The court did concede that the exemption does not follow
the statutory language in that this situation did not involve the
atmosphere over land, but rather the atmosphere over water. 1
35
However, the Ninth Circuit decided it did not make the EPA's
determination unreasonable.' 36  Here, the EPA linked the
exception with the restriction of public access, which was
consistent with the agency's regulations. 137 The Clean Air Act
itself does not provide a definition of "ambient air," but the EPA
defined it in its regulation as "that portion of the atmosphere,
external to buildings, to which the general public has access."'
38
The court found the EPA's decision to grant an exemption for air
over water was not inconsistent with the regulation.13 9
REDOIL's second argument regarding the ambient air
exemption also failed. 140  REDOIL claimed the EPA departed
from its longstanding definition of "ambient air" without
reason. 141 The court conceded the definition dealt with situations
that involved atmosphere over land and required fences. 1
42
Furthermore, the EPA did have the authority to regulate air over
OCS sources, and the EAB's assertion that giving the EPA
leeway in deciding exemptions in those instances made sense to





138Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1992)).
139 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 753.
140 id.
141 Id.
142Id. (citing In re Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc., 15 E.A.D. - .... 60 (Jan. 12,
2012)).
143 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 753 (citing In re Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc., 15
E.A.D. - .... 60 (Jan. 12, 2012))The court states that requiring Shell to build a
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previous EPA determination, in which the agency recognized a
safety zone implemented by the Coast Guard as sufficient to
restrict public access because it created a boundary of control. 144
Thus, the EPA in granting the exemption to Shell did not deviate
impermissibly from its prior definition of "ambient air" because
it involved control and restriction to the public.'45 The EAB's
dismissal of REDOIL's second complaint was therefore
upheld. 146 As such, REDOIL lost both of its appeals, first on the
issue of the permits not requiring BACT to be used for support
vessels, and secondly on its challenge regarding the ambient air
exemption.
IV. COMMENT
The environment is a contentious topic in American
politics. During his second inaugural speech, President Obama
managed to stir up excitement and speculation when he promised
to take a firmer stance on environmental protection. 147 However,
there was another issue facing his second presidential term that
resonated with voters: the economy.' 48 The President made big
promises to ease both problems, but some see them as
incompatible. 49 Due to such a politically-charged climate, some
fence in the ocean would be unreasonable. Id.144 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 753.
145 Id.
146 id.
147 David J. Unger, Inauguration 2013 speech: Obama puts energy, climate




148 Jeffrey M. Jones, Obama's Performance, Economy Foremost in Voters'
Minds, GALLUP (June 14, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155186/obama-
performance-economy-foremost-voters-minds .aspx.49 Unger, supra note 148 (pointing out that the President did not mention oil
and gas production at all during his speech regarding the environment).
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critics from both sides of the environmental versus economics
issue fear Chevron and Auer deference leave room for judges to
insert themselves into the debate, taking power away from the
agencies tasked with balancing the two interests.
The EPA, as the agency vested by Congress with the
authority to regulate the environment, often takes the brunt of
Americans' anger. Some believe the EPA does not do enough to
help the environment; others believe the EPA 5places too many
regulations on the already troubled economy. However, the
EPA does not deserve all of this criticism. The courts that review
the EPA's decisions should also share some of the blame. To
some, the deference given to federal agency decision-making
often gives the appearance of the EPA getting away with
whatever agenda it is purported to hold. However, the courts
apply the standards of review. In a way, the judges writing the
court opinions have the opportunity to apply their political beliefs
during the decision making process, due to the less than rigid
boundaries given in the deference tests employed in the cases.
A. Pro-Business or Pro-Environment?
The EPA faces a lot of criticism that alleges the agency
does not go far enough in its regulations to make any real
difference in the environment. 151 Unfortunately, much of the
EPA's activity may be seen to have a political agenda, which
does nothing to alleviate the concerns of the environmentally
conscious. For example, under the Clean Air Act, the EPA must
review air quality standards every five years. 152  The EPA
complied with this requirement in 2008 and decided those
standards must be tightened.' 5 3  However, the Obama
Administration blocked these new standards from being
implemented, apparently under the guise of a need to make them
150 MCCARTHY & COPELAND, supra note 2, at 1-3.
151 MCCARTHY& COPELAND, supra note 2, at 3.
152 McCARTHY& COPELAND, supra note 2, at 10.
153 MCCARTHY& COPELAND, supra note 2, at 10.
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even more restrictive. 154 In 2010 the revisions were completed,
and the resulting proposed standards were highly controversial. '
Many state's counties would be held to be in violation of these
new standards because of their expansive reach. 156 The changes
required to conform to the new air quality requirements would be
costly, an issue which has always been a sore point for those
subject to the EPA's regulations, both past and present.157
Additionally, many in the American business sector fear
the EPA's regulations are too costly and have the effect of
hurting the already damaged economy.' 58 In December 2012,
when REDOIL v. E.P.A. was heard in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the unemployment rate in Alaska was 6.6%.159 Fishing
is a huge part of the Alaskan economy, creating 78,500 jobs. 16
In recent years, oil drilling has become a prominent money-
maker in the state, also creating more jobs.'16  In fact, Alaska's
oil production could benefit the whole country economically by
relieving the United States' dependence on foreign oil sources. 162
154 MCCARTHY& COPELAND, supra note 2, at 10.
155 McCARTHY& COPELAND, supra note 2, at 11.
156 McCARTHY& COPELAND, supra note 2, at 11.
157 MCCARTHY& COPELAND, supra note 2, at 11.
158 MCCARTHY& COPELAND, supra note 2, at 1.
159 Unemployment Rate Alaska, GOOGLE PUBLIC DATA (March 13, 2013),
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z 1 ebjpgk2654c l&mety=une
mployment.rate&idim=state: ST020000&fdimy=seasonality:S&dl=en&hl=en
&q=unemployment%20alaska.
160 Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Commercial Fisheries, STATE OF
ALASKA (2013),
http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfin?adfg=fishingcommercial.main.
161 Penny Starr, New Study Shows That Offshore Drilling Could Make Alaska
the Eighth Largest Oil Producer in the World - Ahead ofLibya and Nigeria,
CNS.NEWS.COM (Feb. 25, 2011), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/new-study-
shows-offshore-drilling-could-make-alaska-eighth-largest-oil-producer-world.162 id.
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The Chukchi Sea is an important asset to the state, both in
terms of economics and environmental concerns. 163 The Chukchi
Sea has felt the impact of global warming, and it has many types
of wildlife Alaska must consider when making industrial and
economic decisions regarding its waters. 164 However, because
the unemployment rate is a constant stressor, Alaska has
embraced the chance to lease the Chukchi Sea to oil
companies. 165 As for the Beaufort Sea, commercial fishing is
banned to prevent overfishing in the receding waters. 66 Because
fishing is such a major contributor to the Alaskan economy, the
state makes up that money by drilling for oil. 167
Economic concerns prompted Alaska to submit an amicus
168brief to the Ninth Circuit in REDOIL v. E.P.A., stating, "The
State and its citizens have an economic interest in seeing
responsible oil and gas exploration occur on the Outer
Continental Shelf."' 69 It is in this brief that the court found prior
support for not requiring actual fences to be constructed on the
OCS source for there to be a restriction to public access.'
70
Nonetheless, the amicus brief was not solely focused on
economics; the state also mentioned that the Alaska Department
163 Chukchi Sea, AUDUBON ALASKA, http://ak.audubon.org/chukchi-sea.
164 id.
165 IN,
166 Beaufort Sea commercialfishing banned, CBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2011)
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2011/04/15/beaufort-sea-
commercial-fishing-ban.html.
167 Northern Economics, Economic Analysis of Future Offshore Oil and Gas
Development.




168 See Amicus Brief for State of Alaska at * 1 -*2, Resisting Envtl. Destruction
on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S. E.P.A., 704 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2012)
No. 12-70518, 2012 WL 1943747.
169Id. at *1-*2.
170Id. at *3.
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of Environmental Conservation has a desire to make sure the
EPA is acting consistently and responsibly in granting permits.' 71
The amicus brief defended the administrative process the
EPA and EAB went through to approve the permits, wherein the
state noted the EPA did not abuse its discretion.' 72 This "general
observation," as Alaska called it, turned out to be pivotal in the
court finding for the EPA. 173 Because the agency followed its
administrative guidelines, the court affirmed the EPA's issuance
of the permits and the EAB's dismissal of the challenges to those
permits.
174
B. Deference to Whom?
Indisputably, administrative guidelines are important in
reviewing a federal agency's decision. Federal agencies should
be aware of the scope of their authority and adhere to the
boundaries. Before REDOIL even appealed to the EAB, the
EPA's initial determination regarding Shell's exploratory
activities was fair. The Chukchi permit went through two rounds
of public notice and comment, and the permit for the Beaufort
Sea had one round. 175 The EPA complied with the OCS statute
by requiring Shell to use BACT practices when its support
vessels were attached to its drillship and when the drillship was
anchored to the seabed. 176 The ambient air exemption, however,
is not as straightforward in trying to decipher if the EPA was
within its administrative parameters.
171 Id. at *2.
172 Id. at *4.173 id.
174 Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S.
E.P.A., 704 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cir. 2012).
171 Id. at 746.
176 Id. at 747.
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Lest the public think the court will take the opportunity to
favor its environmental inclinations, or, alternatively, business
concerns, it is important to recall the court supposedly has its
own limitations on what it can do with an EPA's course of action.
It must allow for Chevron deference, wherein a court must follow
Congress's intent on the issue, or, if that is unclear, the agency's
interpretation of its own statute must be reasonable.' 
77
The Ninth Circuit in the present case followed this
administrative line of reasoning, which seems to put all concerns
regarding its environmental or pro-business objectivity to rest.
The court determined that Congress's intent was unclear
regarding the two competing provisions in the Clean Air Act that
state how support vessels should be treated, and thus it looked
solely at the question of whether the EPA's interpretation of the
choice between the two was reasonable.' 
78
Even though the court went through the proper steps the
Chevron deference test requires, there was a wrinkle that those
who believe this decision was anti-environment could latch onto.
Was Congress's intent really so unclear? The court scoffs at
REDOIL's use of legislative history when REDOIL wants to
disprove the notion of ambiguity.' 79 Perhaps the court need not
have considered that argument in reference to the ambiguity
issue, but could the legislative history have been useful in the
Ninth Circuit's determination that Congress did in fact make its
intent regarding the use of BACT known? The court stated:
"[h]owever, were the statutory language clear, reference to the
legislative history would be both unnecessary and inappropriate
to illuminate unambiguous text." 180 True, legislative history is
not referenced when the statutory language is clear, but perhaps
in this case, where two provisions provide for two different
177 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
178 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 751.
179 id.
180 id.
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courses of action for the same subject matter, legislative history
could have been illuminating. However, the Ninth Circuit seems
to have taken steps to save itself from criticism at the end of Part
B of its opinion, where it nevertheless analyzed the legislative
history of § 7627 and dismissed it as not being probative of
Congress's intent. 18 1 Therefore the court seems to be following
the course it was administratively required to follow, presumably
resulting in a fair outcome that stays out of environmental
politics. The court was right in its analysis, at least from the
perspective of the law. It followed the tests for Chevron and Auer
deference to the best of its ability and did not create new
standards that defied judicial precedent. Any change in deference
must come from Congress, who has the power to create laws and
determine in the statutes what standard of review is owed to
agency action.
Another tricky point in the opinion occurred when the
Ninth Circuit discussed the ambient air exemption awarded to
Shell. The court, in reviewing this action, could only overturn
the EPA's decision if it was "plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation."' 82 In deciding whether the ambient air
exemption, which has in the past dealt with restrictions over land,
could reasonably be expanded to water, the court ended up
agreeing with the EAB in believing the EPA should be given
"leeway" to regulate OCS sources. 
183
Was this decision to allow the EPA to grant an exemption
to Shell a pro-business move? There is no doubt Shell, or any
other oil company that would qualify, benefitted from this
exemption; that is, drilling operations are not held to expensive
standards for their support vessels when not attached to the
181 Id.
182 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
183 REDOIL, 704 F.3d at 752-53.
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seabed. For the Ninth Circuit's part, it was only following
administrative procedure. It set out the proscribed rules of law,
and followed them.
What about those rules though? Are they enough to
remove the EPA and the courts from political influence? Justice
Scalia would argue they are not.184 He expressed his growing
concerns with Auer deference in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan
Bell Telephone Co.,185 in which he explained his old view of the
standard in terms of it being interrelated to the Chevron deference
test. 186  Justice Scalia stated Congress should not pass an
imprecise statute and then leave it to an agency to make its
regulations with relatively little parameters.' 87 As a result,
"deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own rule
encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the
power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases."'
Though this seems to be pointing the finger at agencies in
that they have free reign to make regulations however they want,
courts should also be examined for potential biases that may
come through in their decisions. Justice Scalia discussed the
advantages of Auer deference in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan
Bell Telephone Co., one of them being the ease of which courts
can review agency decisions. 189 However, this article argues that
standard of review leaves the judge a chance to impart his beliefs
about an agency's action. Auer requires an interpretation to be
affirmed so long as it is consistent with the regulation.'9" That is
184 Jon Robinson, Justice Scalia Questions Validity of Deference to Agency
Interpretations, NAVWATERS.COM (June 10, 2011),
http://navwaters.com/2011/06/1 0/justice-scalia-questions-validity-of-
deference-to-agency-interpretations/.
185 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 131 S. Ct 2254, 2265-
66(2011).
18 Id. at 2266.187 id.
188 id.
189 d.190 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
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a flimsy standard. Courts have a lot of room to take other issues
into consideration when deciding whether something is
consistent. For example, in, REDOIL v. E.P.A., the court may
well have accounted for Alaska's economic situation when it
reviewed the ambient air exemption.
Chevron also gives courts much discretion, especially in
the second step. Step one of the deference test is pretty rigid in
that Congress is required to have its intention followed. 191 It is in
step two that courts could insert their own bias, in which judges
have the discretion to decide what is "reasonable."' 192 Rapanos v.
US.193 is a good example of how judges can radically differ in
what they conclude, while using the same Chevron deference
test. There were three different opinions in Rapanos which
purport to say what a "reasonable" definition of "navigable
waters" was. 194
Because the courts can vary in their implementation of the
Chevron deference test, the EPA suffers more criticism than
usual. Some suggest the EPA will always win, because the
courts must follow rules that are designed to favor federal
agencies. 195 It is the standards of review, though, that invite bias
not of the agency, but of judges deciding the case. There will
never be concrete proof of this, only speculation, but it is a
probable explanation of why cases involving the EPA garner so
191 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
192 See id.
193 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
194 See id.
195 James Christman, David S. Harlow & Craig Harrison, Courts Should Not
Defer to Agencies' Interpretations of Their Own Rules, 15 LEGAL
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much criticism for being arbitrary. Perhaps the results, whether
they lean more pro-environment or pro-business, should be
reviewed in the context surrounding the case. Turning
to,REDOIL v. E.P.A., Alaska's economy would be greatly
affected by the result. 9 6 Also, the EPA did not deviate from any
regulation, but rather chose one of two conflicting provisions of
the OCS statute.' 97 If the ambient air exemption had been for a
source of pollution located on land, REDOIL probably would not
have been able to challenge the exemption at all. But because
Shell's ambient air exemption would have been for sources on
water, the EPA, and then the Ninth Circuit, did not split hairs
about the fence requirement and adjusted its exemption
accordingly.' 98 The EPA was not acting outrageously, and so the
court may have given them leeway in the Chevron deference test
and in applying Auer deference. The standards of review in this
case allowed much discretion for the court, and though there is no
clear evidence of what outside influences affected it, the court
was at least aware of them.
V. CONCLUSION
Shell and, presumably, other oil drilling companies in the
future may feel benefitted by the decision in REDOIL v. E.P.A.
Even so, the EPA, the EAB, and the Ninth Circuit each worked
within their legal and regulatory perimeters to come to a decision,
which should quiet pro-environment critics. However, the reality
is that these three bodies did exercise just enough discretion, even
within the bounds of their authority, to invite frustration. The
EPA and its decisions have been, and will most likely continue to
be, a source of political conflict, even though all of the blame
should not be on the EPA. The courts exercise discretion under
196 See Amicus Brief for State of Alaska, Resisting Envtl. Destruction on
Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S. E.P.A., 704 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2012) No.
12-70518, 2012 WL 1943747.
197 Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S.
E.P.A., 704 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2012).
'
98Id. at 753.
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deferential standards of review, which are flimsy enough that
judges could insert their own pro-business or pro-environment
biases into a case. Justice Scalia has expressed his concern over
letting others besides Congress dictate the law, and that argument
should be based on an awareness of the power of the courts under
Chevron and Auer.
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